Chicago Child Visitation Lawyer

Purpose of Requests for Admission

 Under Supreme Court Rule 216, a party can serve on any other party a written request for the admission of the truth of any fact or the genuineness of any document.  While the scope of a request is limited only by the imagination of the trial lawyer, the most common use of requests for admission in divorce litigation is to obtain the admission of documents without the need for calling a witness at trial to establish a foundation for the document.  For example, a trial lawyer who plans on offering bank records into evidence at trial can establish the authenticity of the records and lay a foundation that the records are business documents by a request for admission served on the opposing party instead of by calling a witness from the bank.

Practice

 Under plain meaning of Supreme Court Rule 216, a party served with a request for admission must either answer or object within 28 days or the matters in the request are deemed admitted.  However, the courts seem reluctant to enforce Rule 216 as written.  Supreme Court Rule I83 expressly provides that the court “for good cause shown on motion after notice to the opposite party, may extend the time for filing any pleading or the doing of any act which is requested by the rules to be done within a limited period, either before or after the expiration of the time.”  As a result, and not surprisingly, most courts will allow a party to serve a late response to a request to admit under certain circumstances.  See Smoot v. Knott, 200 Ill.App.3d 1982, 558 N.E.2d 794, 146 Ill.Dec. 831 (5th Dist. 1990), for an exhaustive survey of the law across the state with regard to whether a court has discretion to allow a late response to a request for admission.  However, it should be noted that in Bright v. Dicke 166 Ill.2d 204, 652 N.E.2d 275, 209 Ill.Dec. 735 (1995), the Supreme Court specifically stated that the Smoot court’s rationale in allowing service of a late response was flawed.  It is not enough that the propounding party is not prejudiced by late response was flawed.  It is not enough that the propounding party is not prejudiced by late service.  The responding party has the burden of showing good cause as to why the response is late.

 Beyond that, courts have refused to enforce Rule 216 under other circumstances.  In Deboe v. Flick, 172 Ill.App.3d 673, 526 N.E.2d 913, 122 Ill.Dec. 510 5th Dist. 1988), with an unclear record from the trial court, the appellate court refused to consider facts that were admitted through a request for admission because the request for admission was not timely brought to the attention of the trial court and because the party that served the request for admission introduced evidence at trial on the facts deemed to be admitted and so “waived” its right to rely on the admitted facts.  In LaSalle National Bank of Chicago v. Akande, 235 Ill.App.3d 53, 600 N.E.2d 1238, 175 Ill.Dec. 780 (2d Dist. 1992), the party served with a request for admission simply wrote a letter to the other party stating that it, the first party, was not responding to the request for admission.  No objection was filed with the trial court.  Nonetheless, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in not allowing a late response to the request for admission. 

 In 1998, the Supreme Court reexamined the purpose and scope of requests to admit facts in P.R.S. International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill.2d 224, 703 N.E.2d 71, 234 Ill.Dec. 459 (1998).  Shred Pax served a set of requests for admission on PRS; however, PRS failed to deny or object to the requests within 28 days.  Based on the non-response, the requests were deemed admitted.  Thereafter, Shred Pax moved for and was granted summary judgment in the case.

 After reversal by the appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Shred Pax’s leave to appeal.  In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court drew clearer boundaries as to what can and cannot be asked in a request to admit.  In accordance with P.R.S., a litigant may ask the opponent to admit so-called “ultimate facts” that lead the trier of fact to infer an element of a case, but a litigant may not ask an opponent to admit a legal conclusion.  Even if the party receiving a request to admit never response to it, a request that asked for a legal conclusion will still not be deemed admitted. 703 N.E.2d at 77.

 For example, a proper request to admit may state: “In 1998, Mrs. Smith spent $20,000 of the assets from a joint account on a Rolex watch for her boyfriend.”  An improper request would state: “In 1998, Mrs. Smith dissipated the parties’ marital estate in the amount of $20,000.”  The first request seeks an “ultimate fact” in proving dissipation, but the second seeks to admit the legal conclusion of dissipation itself.
Divorce Las Vegas

The tiral court did not abuse its discretion by requiring father to pay the medical expenses of children to the extent those expenses were covered by his insurance. Imes v. Imes.
 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by setting the child support payments of father at $25 per week for daughter. Imes v. Imes.
 Where respondent husband did not object to the terms of the dissolution judgment imposing support obligations solely on him, and where he never appealed the dissolution judgment, the trial court properly ordered that the noncustodial wife was not required to pay child support. In re Kraft.
 The support of a child is the joint and several obligation of both the husband and the wife. In re Butler.
 The financial responsibility for the support of the child is a joint and several obligation of each parent, and is proper for the court to consider the income and assets of the wife and husband in setting the amount awarded. Riordan v. Riordan.
 The obligation of the father to support his children begins when the child is born and continues during the minority of the child. This obligation of the father to support his minor child is not affected by a decree granting a divorce, nor by a decree granting the care and custody of his child to his wife or some other suitable person. Nelson v. Nelson.
 When the parents of a child are divorced and no mention is made in the decree for the care and custody of minor child, under the law, the father is still bound to provide a reasonable and proper support for a minor child. People ex rel. Hartshorn v. Hartshorn.
 The duty of a parent to support his minor child arises out of a natural relationship. Nelson v. Nelson.
See Also:  Womens Divorce

 Where there was no support in the record for the belief that the trial court’s decision on child support payments should be affected by defendant’s foster children, as he had no financial responsibility for them because they were provided for by the state, defendant’s foster children should not have been a consideration in the court’s child support payment decision. People v. Hines.
 Evidence of defendant’s emotional problems after being involuntarily discharged in 1975, his attempts to find work both in Chicago and California, and his current financial and employment situation supported the trial court’s conclusion that defendant was acting in good faith in seeking an abatement of his child support obligations. Glass v. Peitchel.
 A construction of the act that does not enforce provisions which rely solely upon a percentage, but does enforce provisions with a minimum or “final” dollar figure carries out the statutory goals of the legislative enactment. In re LIss.
 The standards contained in this section regarding child support are applicable to the determination of temporary child support. In re Rogliano.
 The guidelines for determining child support contained in this section much be followed when a court determines support in cases brought under the Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/10-10). People ex rel. Browning v. Melton.
 The percentage guidelines set forth in subsection (a) of this section establish a “minimum” amount of supporting party’s net income, not a “maximum.” In re McBride/
 The substantive factors of subsection (a) of this section have been adopted by the courts as a point of reference for determining motions filed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section; however, it does not require the trial court to either adhere to the minimum percentage guidelines or to make specific findings to explain its departure therefrom. Daredeuff v. Daredeuff.
 Where trial court ordered respondent to pay $700 or 45% of his net income, whichever would be greater, and as for child support, the trial court’s judgment may be affirmed to the extent that it stated respondent’s support obligation in a specific dollar amount if that determination is otherwise valid. In re Fahy.
 Where the individual incomes of both parents are more than sufficient to provide the reasonable needs of the parties’ children, taking into account the lifestly the children would have absent the dissolution, the court is justified in setting a figure below the guideline amount. In re Bush.

See Also:  Divorce Lawyers New York