The trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating father’s visitation privileges with his two year old daughter on the basis that sexual abuse committed by father on daughter during those visitation periods seriously endangered daughter’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health. In re Ashby.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the weekend joint custody schedule was detrimental to the children’s best interests where its frequency prevented a balanced relationship, or recreation time, with their mother and new family unit. In re Kessler.
The evidence did not support a finding that the visitation with non-custodial parent seriously endangered the welfare of the children so as to warrant termination of visiting rights. In re Blanchard.
Where father presented evidence that mother rather than he sexually abused child and psychologists concluded that visitation between child and father would not harm the child, trial court’s decision to terminate dissolution decree visitation rights of father was abuse of discretion. In re Dunn.
There was no showing of an abuse of the trial court’s discretion in awarding the mother visitation rights, even though she left them at a very young age, where the evidence showed that she had married at 16, that she had matured since that time, and that she had left her family due to her husband’s drinking and gambling problem. Aud v. Etienne.
A provision in a marital settlement that provided for stepparent visitation was unenforceable where both of the child’s parents were living and she had wholesome relationships with both of them, and the child was not consulted about her desires with regard to visitation with her former stepparent. In re Booth.
Where domestic partner made no argument that she had standing under any subsection of 750 ILCS 5/607 to seek visitation of three children born during her relationship with the children’s mother, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the partner’s petition for visitation. R.H. v. E.W. (In re A.W.)
Standing to petition for visitation, if it exists, must be found solely within the specific provisions of this section as the stature supersedes and supplants the common law of visitation in Illinois.
Evidence of sexual abuse and transmission of sexually transmitted disease satisfied the rigorous endangerment standard of this section. In re Woppel
In order to prevail on the motion to terminate visitation rights, petitioner had to convince the trier of fact that the sexual abuse had in fact occurred, and that the abuse seriously endangered to child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health. In re Dunn.
A termination of visitation is a restriction, as is prohibition on overnight visitation; likewise, a requirement that visitation is supervised, occur in the home of the custodial parent, or outside the home of the noncustodial parent is restriction. In re Fields.
An order which provided, in pertinent part, that respondent was entitled to one week’s summertime visitation, excluding overnight visitation, and supervised overnight weekend visitation with his minor son, amounted to a restriction of his visitation rights under subsection (c) of this section. In re Anderson.
Court order restricting respondent’s visitation rights by requiring that visitation be supervised by heterosexual employees of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, reducing her visitation to alternate weekends, eliminating overnight visitation, and requiring that she enroll in regular psychotherapy was against the manifest weight of the evidence; there was no evidence in the record that respondent was a defiant and hostile lesbian or that child has any confusion about having “two mothers”. Pleasant v. Pleasant.
Sexual orientation is not relevant to a parent’s visitation rights. Pleasant v. Pleasant.
Courts are reluctant to restrict visitation rights; such reluctance is based on a recognition of the parental feelings of a divorced spouse who has not been granted custody or on the theory that restriction should be limited to cases where extraordinary circumstances are present or where the unfitness of the parent being denied is clearly shown. Blazina v. Blazina.
Absent allegations of impropriety or misconduct, equity and good conscience require that the parent who is permitted to visit should be able to do so under some arrangement which does not require him, or her, to stay in the home of the parent having custody under this parent’s watchful eye or even in his absence. Patton v. Armstrong.
The trial court abused its discretion in allowing the child’s father only very limited visitation with his child, and then only in the home of the maternal grandparents where the restrictions imposed were not shown to be necessary for the child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health or otherwise required in the best interests of the child. Becton v. Sanders.
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