Modification of Spousal Support Not Allowed
A party cannot stop or reduce his child support payments unless the trial court has approved the modification. In re Ingram
Though the father’s income had drastically diminished, his standard of living had not and the court was apprehensive about reducing the father’s $550 pre month support obligation where he had not seen fit to reduce his discretionary expenses. In re Burris
Where original dissolution agreement stated husband (petitioner) was to pay mortgage until date of sale of home, trial court’s the mortgage payments until the date of the sale of the home was thus clearly in violation of subsection (a) of this section. In re Pitts
Past-due installments of child support are the vested right of the designated recipient; thus, the court lacks the authority to modify those amounts that have already accrued. In re Erickson
The trial court would not reverse a concededly adequate award of maintenance and child support based on a hypothetical and highly speculative argument regarding the possible future increase in the reasonable needs of petitioner or the minor children; should those needs in fact increase, petitioner could simply seek modification of the judgment by direct motion to the trial court. In re Wilder
The portions of the circuit court’s orders which modified the provision of the judgment of divorce concerning Bar Mitzvah expenses was reversed, because the settlement unambiguously stated that defendant would pay for the party. In re Roth
While the appeal of a prior order was still pending, and the trial court changed the order by specifically adding the following: (1) “that the only material change it could consider would be the termination of plaintiff’s social security benefits, and (2) that there was no substantial change in defendant’s income since November 26, 1975 order,” the trial curt did not have authority to modify its order after a notice of appeal from such order had been filed. Dunn v. Dunn
Modification of a separation agreement was not permitted where a father was not attempting to relieve himself of his obligation of support when he entered into a property settlement agreement, but on the contrary, when he promised to pay the costs of his daughter’s college tuition, and expenses for a scholastic year, without contribution by the plaintiff and without a determination of his ability to pay he was contracting to do more than the law required of him; the property settlement agreement was founded upon sufficient consideration; and the father sought a reduction of his obligation with no reciprocal officer on his part to restore the property rights which the mother released to him. The court could not release one of the contracting parties from terms actually agreed upon but later found disadvantageous when the party had already enjoyed the benefits of the agreement. Gaddis v. Gaddis